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International harmonization of standards and regulations is often a goal expressed in 
trade agreements because it is expected to yield gains from trade. Absence of progress 
toward harmonization is often interpreted as being motivated by protectionism, with 
differences in standards and regulations seen as non-tariff barriers. While 
protectionism may well be the source of resistance to harmonization, there may be 
other reasons it is not pursued. These alternative explanations have not received much 
attention from economists. In this article some of these alternatives are outlined – 
demand effects from altering standards, switching costs, proprietary technologies. The 
article concludes that proposals for international harmonization need to be scrutinized 
carefully. 
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With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as 
possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their 
resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing 
bodies of international standards for products for which they either have 
adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations. 
Article 2.6, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
There was one (Christmas) card I particularly resented sending. It was to 
the EEC Agricultural Commissioner in Brussels. I would rather have sent 
him a redundancy notice. He is even worse than his colleagues, and I can’t 
speak worse of anybody than that. He’s the fool who has forced through 
the plan to standardise the Eurosausage. By the end of next year we’ll be 
waving goodbye to the good old British sausage, and we’ll be forced to 
accept some foreign muck like salami or bratwurst in its place. 
Of course, they can’t actually stop us eating British sausage. But they can 
stop us calling it sausage. It seems that it’s got to be called the Emulsified 
High-Fat Offal Tube. 
James Hacker, fictitious British cabinet minister in the television comedy 
series “Yes Prime Minister” (Lynn and Jay, 1986, p. 11) 
 
t is generally accepted, although less often explicitly stated, that harmonization of 
standards and regulations on a multilateral basis is a desirable policy goal. 
Harmonization of standards is often an explicit goal of regional trade agreements – for 
example, the European Union’s single market initiative and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which have explicit provisions for harmonization. 
Underlying this presumption is the same economic model that predicts gains from 
trade – that welfare will be increased − from the removal of other types of trade 
barriers. It is certainly true that differences in technical standards and regulations can 
act as barriers to trade (Roberts, Josling and Orden, 1999). As with more transparent 
restrictions on market access such as tariffs and quotas, commercial transactions can 
be inhibited and, hence, social welfare reduced, ceteris paribus. The often analytically 
convenient “all other things held constant” assumption in the case of harmonization, 
however, is difficult to justify in a wide range of situations and may lead to 
unwarranted conclusions or biased predictions. We will return to the ceteris paribus 
question below. 
Achieving international harmonization has proved to be a difficult challenge. In 
part this is because, as with other barriers to trade, benefits are conferred on certain 
groups in society that have a vested interest in maintaining country-specific standards. 
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In particular, domestic producers of import-competing goods will benefit from the 
protection that can arise from a failure to harmonize standards and regulations. 
Politicians are mindful of the political value that being able to respond to requests for 
protection can provide. In this way, groups lobbying for the maintenance of country-
specific standards and regulations are similar to other vested interests that seek 
protection through the political process. The result is reflected in formal trade 
agreements that are long on objectives but short on mechanisms that would require 
harmonization. In particular, there are no timetables for harmonization, and a wide 
range of exceptions are allowed. The provisions in trade agreements pertaining to 
harmonization of standards mirror those in trade agreements generally – at any given 
time they reflect the state of the political compromise between the desire of firms that 
wish to engage in international commerce for strong rules of trade to assure their 
investments and the need, at times, of politicians to extend protection to firms faced 
with declining international competitiveness (Kerr and Perdikis, 2003). 
This standard result may explain why harmonization has received relatively scant 
attention at the theoretical level in the economics literature. This does not mean that 
technical barriers to trade have not been extensively studied – they have, but from a 
relatively narrow perspective. In recognition of the fact that lack of harmonization can 
inhibit trade, considerable effort has gone into discerning how individual technical 
standards or regulations inhibit trade, determining the trade effects of removing those 
barriers and developing suggestions for harmonized standards. Efforts have also been 
made to de-politicize the establishment of standards by, for example, having them 
based on scientific criteria – in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (Kerr, 2003) – or by following the lead of the private 
sector – the ISO system (International Organization for Standardization, 2003). There 
have also been some successes in the harmonization of standards (Hansson, 1990). On 
the whole, however, harmonization is a work in progress; and the slowness of that 
progress is generally attributed to the difficulties in overcoming protectionist interests. 
Given this view of the world, international harmonization is being pursued in a 
wide range of multilateral, regional and bilateral venues with little attention given to 
the underlying ceteris paribus assumptions. As some of the harmonization initiatives 
encompass very large economic units – for example, the European single market – it 
is surprising how much is apparently taken on faith. Beyond the traditional “trade 
barrier” approach discussed above, serious economic examination of harmonization is 
relatively sparse.
1 According to Sawyer (2004, p. ii), “Many are calling for the 
harmonization of standards, however there has been little economic analysis of the 
resulting global welfare changes.”   W. A. Kerr 
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Sawyer (2004) has shown over a relatively wide range of market configurations 
that the welfare changes that arise from international harmonization are not 
unambiguously positive once the ceteris paribus assumption is relaxed. This is 
because there is not only a trade effect arising from the removal of the barrier to 
market access – which is unambiguously positive – but also a consumer utility 
(demand) effect – which is likely to be negative. It is possible for the negative 
consumer utility effect to outweigh the positive trade effect, leading to the result that 
international harmonization can be welfare decreasing. Of course, the relative size of 
the two effects is an empirical question, but this result suggests that international 
harmonization initiatives need to be examined more carefully than has been typical in 
the past. 
How does the negative consumer utility effect arise? Assume for the moment that 
two countries have standards for some potentially tradable product that have evolved 
in isolation. Further assume that average tastes in each country differ regarding the 
product attributes that are defined by the standards. Also assume that the standards 
established in each country reflect the taste of the average consumer in that country. In 
other words, the product, as defined by the national standard, represents the 
configuration of the good that will give the average consumer the greatest utility. Of 
course, as consumers are not homogeneous in their tastes in either country, there will 
be individuals in each country that receive less utility than the average consumer 
receives when they consume the product defined by their national standard. Finally, 
assume that these differing national standards prevent trade. 
If conditions exist that would lead to positive trade benefits there may be a 
bilateral initiative to harmonize standards for the product. For simplification, assume 
that the harmonized standard can simply be derived by “splitting the difference” 
between the two standards.
2 Once harmonization takes place the only version of the 
product that can be sold in either country is one that conforms to the harmonized 
standard. What this means is that the average consumer in each country can no longer 
purchase his/her optimum product. For the average consumer in each country this 
would mean that consuming the harmonized product would provide less utility than if 
they consumed the product that had previously been defined by the national standard.
3 
If this loss of utility, in aggregate, is larger than the positive trade benefit the two 
countries receive, then harmonization should not have been pursued. 
While not fully developed (Sawyer, 2004), this approach to harmonization 
provides considerable insight into the factors that may influence the size of the effect 
on consumer utility. A crucial factor is consumers’ strength of preference. If 
consumers have strong preferences for the product defined by their national standard,   W. A. Kerr 
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then the decline in utility will be relatively large as they are required to move away 
from their national standard. On the other hand, if consumers have no strong 
attachment to their national standard, then they will not suffer a significant loss of 
utility if they must consume a good produced to conform to the harmonized standard.
4 
It is easy to see that, if consumers in two different countries have differing strengths of 
preference for products produced to their respective national standards, one country 
would gain from harmonization while the other would lose. The potential losing 
country will have no incentive to engage in the harmonization exercise if doing so 
would require a significant movement away from its national standard. Hence, 
bargaining over relative placement of the harmonized standard will be important to 
ensuring that both countries have an incentive to participate. 
It is also logical that the degree to which the national standards diverge will be 
important in determining the net welfare effects of harmonization. Given a set of 
existing preferences, if national standards are relatively close together, then the 
harmonized product is unlikely to be greatly different from the previous products, and 
consumers will perceive only a small loss in utility. As national standards increasingly 
diverge, goods produced to the harmonized standard will differ to a greater degree 
from the previous goods. 
While the average consumer’s preferences in each country may be reflected in 
the national standards, the distribution of individual preferences around that average 
will also likely be an important factor in determining the net effect of harmonization 
on welfare. If the preferences of consumers are tightly clustered around the national 
standard, the effect is likely to be considerably different than if consumer preferences 
show a wider dispersion. In the latter case more consumers may be closer to the 
harmonized standard than to the national standard; others may on the other hand be 
further away. More work is clearly required to determine the net effects of different 
distributions of consumer preferences on the welfare effects of harmonization. 
While many questions remain regarding the demand effects that result from 
international harmonization of standards and regulations, it seems clear that assessing 
the desirability of harmonization is more complex than is normally assumed. The 
consumer side of harmonization appears to be fertile ground for further theoretical 
investigation. 
More attention has been given to the producer effects of international 
harmonization. Independent national standards and regulations were in many cases 
developed a long time ago. In some cases this means that significant investments in 
infrastructure have been made to support such standards and regulations. As a result, 
international harmonization would involve considerable switching costs. For example,   W. A. Kerr 
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given the economies of scale currently associated with automobile manufacturing, 
having a good proportion of the world’s drivers living under regulations that require 
them to drive on the left while the rest of the world’s drivers live under regulatory 
regimes that have them driving on the right makes no sense from a trade viewpoint. If 
one were to start over with a blank sheet today, one could arbitrarily choose one of the 
options and harmonize this aspect of the world’s motor vehicle regulations. Today, 
however, while engineering automobiles that can be fitted to drive on either side adds 
to their cost,
5 those costs pale relative to the switching costs that would be incurred if 
international harmonization were to be pursued. Beyond the awkwardness of driving 
the existing stock of automobiles on a side of the road they were not designed for and 
the retraining cost/learning-by-doing cost of having drivers alter their driving skills, 
there would be very large costs associated with altering infrastructure – 
freeway/motorway slip roads would all need to be repositioned, curves re-engineered, 
new signage and lights put in place as well as a host of other changes.
6 Further, in this 
case, harmonization would mean that all the costs would be borne by the countries 
that agreed to switch while no costs would be borne by non-switching countries. 
Similar switching costs would apply to other non-harmonized standards such as rail 
track gauges, electrical currents and water distribution systems. In these cases, while 
trade benefits would undoubtedly arise from harmonization, it is very obvious that the 
switching costs are so high that harmonization seems fanciful and not to be considered 
seriously. The point is that there are many areas where, while not as dramatic as the 
cases above, the switching costs could easily outweigh the trade benefits even on a net 
present value basis that accounts for the longer term stream of trade benefits over 
time. Switching costs need to be explicitly taken into account when evaluations of 
international harmonization are undertaken. 
The problem of switching costs suggests that harmonized international standards 
or regulatory regimes should be established prior to widespread adoption of a new 
type of good or technology. One problem is, however, that new products or 
technologies tend to be introduced on a small scale to localized markets. It may not be 
obvious from the beginning that the products/technology will become a tradable 
good/be used internationally. Further, it may not be clear that a product or technology 
will be a commercial success and, as a result, there will be reluctance to commit the 
resources to develop a harmonized standard. If the market development stage is 
prolonged, then it’s possible that by the time the next stage is reached, investments 
will have been made to such a degree that switching costs will have become 
important. Hence, international harmonized standards may fail to develop not because   W. A. Kerr 
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a vested interest is receiving protectionist benefits, but simply as a result of the 
process of establishing the product’s place in the market. 
A further problem, particularly with the commercialization of new technologies, 
is that the firms that have developed the technologies expect their returns to arise from 
their owning proprietary rights to the technology. In some cases international 
harmonization of standards would negate proprietary rights by forcing the developer 
to divulge its technology to competitors. When competing technologies have been 
developed, if one is clearly superior to another, then marketplace competition will 
eventually lead to the result that one technology dominates – de facto becomes the 
internationally harmonized standard. In cases where there is no clearly superior 
technology, more than one may survive and co-exist. Local network externalities may 
be sufficient to inhibit trade. Again, a harmonized international standard will not have 
arisen and trade will appear to be inhibited, but protectionism will not have been the 
root cause. Firms that believe they will reap a proprietary benefit from the intellectual 
property rights attached to a technology or embodied in a good cannot be expected to 
cooperate in the development of international standards. 
International harmonization does not necessarily remove the perception that 
standards and regulations are being used to unduly restrict trade. Unless tastes are 
homogeneous, it is unlikely that the tastes of all consumers will fall within the 
acceptable range of a harmonized standard. This is even the case when science-based 
criteria are used, such as in the SPS Agreement. The controversy surrounding the sale 
of cheeses produced using unpasteurized milk provides an example. Some countries 
ban the import of these types of cheeses based on the risk that consumers could 
contract listeriosis (De Buyser et al., 2002; Sanaa, Coroller and Cerf, 2004). 
Proponents of allowing the import and marketing of cheeses made with unpasteurized 
milk argue that treatment with heat ruins the taste of the product. Some consumers in 
potential importing countries claim they are being denied access to these products. 
Those consumers clearly have a risk preference that is less strict than that of those 
setting the standards – they are willing to make trade-offs whereby they would accept 
a less safe but better tasting cheese. Farmers and processors in France, the major 
producer of cheeses crafted using unpasteurized milk, perceive the import prohibitions 
they face as unnecessary technical barriers to trade. Protectionist motives have also 
been intimated (Coleman and Boughner, 2000). Producers in France chose not to alter 
their production methods for exported products, hence voluntarily forgoing export 
markets. 
What can be concluded regarding the international harmonization of standards 
and regulations and the gains from trade? First, the issue requires far more attention   W. A. Kerr 
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from economists than it has garnered to date. Second, adapting conventional trade 
models that are used primarily to analyze traditional barriers to trade, such as tariffs 
and import quotas, to deal with trade questions related to international harmonization 
of standards and regulations may be inappropriate and lead to incorrect conclusions. 
Third, drawing protectionism-centred conclusions based on simultaneous observation 
of non-harmonized standards and an absence of trade may not be warranted. These 
results should not be taken to mean that international harmonization should never be 
pursued, only that before settling on that course of action careful assessments must be 
undertaken. The results should also not be taken as an endorsement of alternatives to 
harmonization such as acceptance of equivalence or the granting of national treatment. 
While equivalence and national treatment allow for trade along with divergence of 
standards and regulations, they can also entail considerable costs, particularly 
monitoring costs. If foreign standards are accepted, then the foreign products (and 
possibly production processes) may have to be monitored on a continuing basis to 
ensure that the professed standards are maintained. The granting of equivalence or 
national treatment must be re-assessed every time a foreign government changes its 
standards.
7 
While there is little doubt that a failure to fully endorse harmonization is 
sometimes motivated by politicians’ wishes to respond to protectionist requests, it 
may just as well arise from an implicit understanding of switching costs or the 
demand effects that can accompany the abandonment of individual national standards. 
Ensuring a correct imputation of motives is difficult if not impossible. In one case, it 
is probably safe to impute protectionist motives: if the exporting nation unilaterally 
harmonizes with the importer’s standards and market access is not granted, then it is 
probably safe to assume protectionism is the source of the restriction on trade.
8 Of 
course, the importer may still argue that foreign interpretation or implementation of 
their standards is not adequate but, over time, mechanisms can be developed to 
overcome these types of deficiencies.   W. A. Kerr 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  See Sawyer (2004) for a review of the literature pertaining to harmonization. 
2.  In other words, there are no technical rigidities that reduce the efficacy of the 
product or significantly raise the cost of producing the harmonized product relative 
to the products that conform to the national standards of the two countries. 
3.  In a simple, partial equilibrium, two-country international market trade diagram 
this would be manifest as an inward shift in the demand curve in each market. See 
Gaisford and Kerr (2001) for this well known trade model. 
4.  Lancaster’s (1991) characteristics approach can provide some insights into these 
questions. 
5.  These costs may not be trivial. For years U.S. automakers complained that they 
were unable to export their products to Japan yet steadfastly refused to engineer 
their cars and trucks so that they could be fitted to drive on the left side of the road 
– right-hand drive − as Japanese regulations require. Of course, Japan early on 
engineered their cars so that they could be fitted for both their domestic market and 
major export markets in the United States and Europe. It may be, however, that 
U.S. automakers perceived that this investment would have been wasted because 
they believed Japan would simply find other means to restrict access to their 
domestic automobile market. 
6.  Switching driving sides is not impossible, however; some countries, for example 
Sweden, have done it. 
7.  Once harmonization takes place, however, there are also negotiation costs that 
must be incurred every time one or more parties wish(es) to alter the standard.  
8.  One example of this type of protectionism may be the case of beef grading within 
the NAFTA. The NAFTA makes provisions for the harmonization of agricultural 
standards such as grading (Kerr, 1988). Without harmonization, Canadian beef 
entering the United States cannot be graded and is sold as ungraded beef. As a 
result it does not receive the price premiums received by graded beef in the United 
States even if it is of identical quality (Kerr, 1992). Frustrated with the lack of 
progress on harmonization, Canada unilaterally altered its grading criteria to 
conform to U.S. standards – although without formally altering the grade names. 
The United States continues refuse to classify Canadian beef as being graded to 
U.S. standards and refuses to consider developing mechanisms to implement a 
harmonized system (Kerr, 1997). 
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